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Executive Summary
By monitoring each driver’s driving characteristics individually, car in-
surance premiums can be set to directly reflect that driver’s risk. Since
such premiums tend to be cheaper, their uptake has increased in recent
years, even outside the original market of young drivers. However, a lot
of data (including GPS) is collected about each car journey in order to
judge the driver’s ability which raises privacy issues, with a particular
concern being that every car journey can be reconstructed from that
data. We looked at what to change (or remove) from the collected data
so that driver’s journeys couldn’t be reconstructed, while retaining as
much information about each driver as possible so the insurance com-
pany can still study a driver’s charcateristics and potentially use the
bulk data for testing new methods in future.
Control F1 does not want to use private key cryptography for customer
relation reasons. We have deduced that GPS data would have to be
deleted to retain privacy, however a quick experiment and a literature
review suggests using heading and distance travelled data would still be
sufficient to reconstruct journeys.
We considered deleting GPS data and time data and then randomising
all the data points of a journey. This removes most of the information
about the journey but the ”estimated journey vector” constructed from
the bearing and distance data will still be retained. The journey vector
most accurately matched the actual GPS calculated journey vector for
longer journeys and non-circular journeys. Also, particularly for longer
journeys, it can be used to identify similar journeys e.g. someone’s
commute.
Cars slow down at junctions and traffic lights so data points are more
commonly taken just before a turn. This effects the accuracy of the
bearing and distance data. We studied the error in the ”local estimated
journey vector” caused by a junction. We suspect distance errors grow
faster than bearing errors, which agrees with the analysed data.
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1 Introduction
(1.1) The use of small devices placed in ones car to monitor driving are becom-
ing more common, enabling insurance companies to price insurance based
on driving ability rather than a more general system based on more generic
information such as age, make of car etc. Since these boxes decrease pre-
miums they are becoming more common, even outside the original market
of young drivers. As such policies become more prevalent there will be an
increasing number of privacy conscious people wanting these policies who are
very concerned about the data that is being kept on them and what it could
be used for. Such queries from customers have already started to emerge.
(1.2) A major concern is that the data collected on these devices is detailed enough
that the driver’s life could be tracked off their car journeys. These boxes
typically create a data point every minute (or if there is a serious brak-
ing/accelerating event) and the data recorded at that moment include:
GPS Position
Time
Bearing
Distance travelled since last data point
Speed
Any sudden acceleration or de-acceleration events (categorised)
(1.3) One particular area of concern is the holding of GPS data, from which Jour-
neys can easily be retraced. In America GPS data cannot be legally stored
and such a change could potentially happen here.
(1.4) We are investigating the minimum amount of data to change (or remove)
from the collected data so that driver’s journeys can not be reconstructed. On
the other hand we want to retain as much detail as possible so the insurance
companies can still judge driving characteristics using their scoring algorithm
and can also maintain a detailed historical database for testing against new
algorithms.
(1.5) One simple mechanism to secure the data is public key cryptography, but
Control F1 want to avoid this method due to problems explaining this to
many customers. In addition, if a driver did want to reconstruct a journey
(e.g. to fight a speeding ticket, prove to police their car was not where
they believe it was) they would need to provide the private key, which many
will have lost as it is difficult to stress that it must be kept safe. This then
becomes a PR problem and a real one since such queries are already received.
(1.6) The problem was broken down into a number of different goals. We shouldn’t
be able to reconstruct a journey, its start and end points nor its journey
vector from
(a) just one journey’s information
(b) all journey data from the same driver.
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A secondary goal is that
(c) we should not be able to identify the driver’s ids from a given particular
journey i.e. it should be difficult to recognise that two journeys are the same.
(1.7) (b) is a much harder problem than (a) since a driver’s next journey will
start where the previous one finished so theoretically this allows the number
of data points about the drivers movements to tend to infinity. This also
increases the chances of distinctive features of the journey to appear. For
example, if the driver is doing 70mph, without speeding he must be on a
motorway or dual carriageway which is a much smaller network than the
entire UK road network. Then given the bearing data (and the fact these
roads tend to wind less than other roads) that motorway/dual carriageway
could probably be identified and the rest of the journey backward constructed
from there.
(1.8) Question (c) is about relating journeys to each other. Even if you can not
reconstruct the driver’s journey, if you can identify a journey that is being
done regularly (e.g. the commute) that also contains personal information.
Additionally, if two journeys are identified as the same the data points could
potentially be intertwined increasing the knowledge about the journey and
hence increase the chance of identifying the route.
(1.9) In section 2 we consider reconstructing a journey without GPS data. In
Section 3 we assume the data points at different points have been randomised.
The ”estimated journey vector” will still be retained so we consider how
accurately it represents the actual ”journey vector” and whether it can be
used to relate similar journeys. Some of the errors arising from studying
journeys using bearing, distance and speed data arises as cars slow down
prior to turns so there is excessive sampling in these places which throws of
the data’s accuracy for calculating journeys. In section 4 we quantify the
errors introduced by a junction.
2 Tracking a Journey without GPS Data
(2.1) To not be able to reconstruct journeys, it was clear that the GPS data would
have to be removed since it is too specific. Was this sufficient to anonymise
the data so journeys could no longer be reconstructed?
(2.2) To test this we naively tried reconstructing a journey experimentally. We
assumed the car was travelling at a constant speed so data points were taken
equal distance apart. Using a bit of string, marked at regular intervals, half
the group laid out a route on a small map of Manchester. At each mark, a
bearing was taken. This bearing data and the map was then passed to the
other group who successfully managed to reconstruct the journey relatively
quickly. The main points we noticed were:
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1)For the human eye, drawing the instantaneous direction vector (bearing)
at each point one after the other constructed a basic shape for the journey
which could then be roughly identified on the road map.
2)Some features of the journey were easier to directly relate to roads on the
map. For example, a section of two or three data points at a roughly constant
bearing indicated a long straight section of road.
3)Parts of the journey where there was constant changes of direction (e.g.
on small side roads) were harder to relate to specific roads. But when a
major feature was identified you could work backwards to find where the car
had been. This suggests less dense rural roads are easier to track a journey
without GPS data. However even for an urban journey, although it might
start on small back streets you tend to go onto the more major roads for the
majority of the journey.
(2.3) This implied that journeys could be reconstructed using only bearing, dis-
tance and speed data, so a literature search was performed to back up this
proposition. Chief among the papers found were methods of curve matching
using algorithms to minimise Frechet Distance between a route on a map
and routes garnered from sampled travel data. For two curves given as con-
tinuous maps pi1 : [0, p1] → Rd and pi2 : [0, p2] → Rd, the Frechet distance is
defined as
(2.4)
dF (pi1, pi2) := inf
α : [0, 1]→ [0, p1]
β : [0, 1]→ [0, p2]
max
t∈[0,1]
||pi1(α(t))− pi2(β(t))||2
(2.5) Frechet distance is sometimes referred to as dog-leash distance, the minimum
length of a leash required to connect a dog and its owner as they walk,
without backtracking, along their respective curves from one endpoint to the
other. Such matching algorithms are well established, and when tested on
maps containing 430,000 vertices and 820,000 edges (Berlin, from Chen et.
al. [2]) matches can be obtained with routes on standard desktop computers
in average runtimes of minutes (also backed up by work of Wenk et. al. [5]
using similar data from Athens which contained more noise due to extensive
construction happening in the city at the time of the data being collected).
For a good discussion of the algorithms see also Alt et. al. [1], and for one
where GPS data is used (which would seem to be ripe for adapting for bearing
data instead) see Rahmani et. al. [4]. This suggests that with more powerful
computing equipment curve matching, even over larger areas, from journey
vectors is either feasible currently, or will become much more so in future
years.
3 Journey Vector
(3.1) From the previous section, it appears that even without GPS data the driver’s
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journey could still be reconstructed necessitating that the data must be fur-
ther anonymised.
(3.2) It was then felt one of the other most informative pieces of information for
journey reconstruction, which gives the insurance company relatively little
information about the driver, was the time stamp. This information is mostly
used to sort the data entries, to track the direction the car was travelling
relative to the sun (as more accidents occur when driving into the sun) and
determine how dark it was when driving (as more accidents happen at night
and some premiums limit/restrict night time driving). However this useful
data could be stored in extra, much less informative data entries such as:
Darkness Level - Day,Transition,Night or Travel direction within 5 degrees
of the sun - Yes/No. So if the time stamps were removed and replaced with
these entries, then all of one driver’s journey entries randomly rearranged
(either amongst one journey or all journeys made by that driver) there is far
less information to reconstruct journeys, while still retaining all necessary
data for the insurance company.
(3.3) However what information about the journeys could you gather from these
now randomised data entries? One crucial piece of information that is still
retained is the ”estimated journey vector” for the whole journey. At each
time stamp using the bearing and distance data you can construct a vector of
that journey segment. This is only an estimate since we assume the car has
travelled at that bearing in a straight line the entire time since the previous
time stamp. These vectors (at each time stamp) can be added (as vectors)
to give an estimated journey vector for the full journey. Even if these time
stamps are rearranged the estimated journey vector won’t change (a standard
property of vector addition).
(3.4) We want to know how much information this ”estimated journey vector
contains”. Can it be used to identify similar journeys, or one done often
e.g the commute? Is it an accurate method for identifying the direction
and distance travelled? Does its accuracy vary with length of journey (as if
you had all the data stamps for one driver you can theoretically construct
an estimated journey vector as long as you want) or the frequency of time
stamps?
3.1 Accuracy
(3.5) We looked at how accurate the estimated journey vector was at estimating
the genuine journey vector. The genuine journey vector could be calculated
using the GPS positions at the start and end of the journey. There are errors
introduced by the GPS data but these are generally small and they only play
a major role where the distance travelled between the start and end point
are particularly small (e.g. a circular trip).
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(3.6) Figures 1 and 2 consider the accuracy of the journey vector for data points
taken every minute and every 2 minutes. The data we had was for journeys
every 1 minute. Lower frequency data could be analysed by ignoring every
2nd (2nd and 3rd etc.) data point. However since most journeys were short,
if we reduced the time stamps frequency significantly there was only two or
three data points for a journey.
(3.7) Figures 1 and 2 show that the error between the actual and estimated journey
vector was quite high. For the estimation of distance travelled, less than 50
percent of all journeys were within even 10 percent accuracy or the actual
distance for both 1min or 2min time stamps. However for bearing a very
high proportion (almost 40 percent) was within 10 degrees of accuracy for
both 1min and 2min time steps.
(3.8) As expected when decreasing the number of time steps the accuracy de-
creased. However in both cases a significant minority of journeys had very
large errors. One reason for this could be that they represent short journeys,
and short journeys only have very few data points so any errors contribute to
a proportionally larger percentage error with the journey vector. Compar-
ing Figure fig:LongerJourneys to Figure 1 we can see evidence that indeed a
much lower proportion of journeys have inaccurate journey vectors on these
longer journeys. A much small minority still have large errors which we
largely attribute to circular routes where you return to your starting point
(e.g. dropped someone off at the train station and returning home without
stopping the car). There journeys have very short journey vectors so small
inaccuracies cause large errors.
(3.9) A small amount of data was available where time stamps were taken every
second. This data was not from genuine customers using the boxes, but
from tests of the overall system in a couple of cars. This data is shown in
Figure 4 and, as expected, showed significantly more accuracy than the one or
two minute data. However this most starkly illustrates that the ”estimated
journey vector” gives an accurate approximation of the bearing angle (to
within 10 degrees) a much higher proportion of the the time than it gives an
accurate estimation of the distance travelled in that direction.
3.2 Relating Two Journeys
(3.10) We have discussed in the previous section the accuracy of the journey vector.
This considered the question of whether we could reconstruct information
about a journey from one journey’s data. However suppose there were many
of these journeys with the time stamps randomised, relating to one driver.
If similar journeys could be identified from the data then a commute (for
example) could be identified and combining the data from all those journeys
you think are the same would increase the likelihood of reconstructing it.
Or similarly you might be able to identify one driver if you have a copy of
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Figure 1: Accuracy of distance and bearing estimation of the journey vector for one
minute time steps
Figure 2: Accuracy of distance and bearing estimation of the journey vector for two
minute time steps
Figure 3: Accuracty of the distance and bearing data for journeys over 20 minutes
long for time stamps taken at one minute time steps
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Figure 4: Accuracy of distance and bearing estimation of the journey vector for one
second time steps only considering journeys over 10min in length
a journey made by one person, and it matches similar journeys but this one
driver.
(3.11) We compared the journey vectors for every journey in our dataset. We
defined two journeys to be the same if the length of their journey vectors
was within 10 percent and the heading was within 10 degrees. We then
compared these results to the GPS data to determine which journeys were
actually the same and whether we had been able to identify them. Journeys
under 100m in length were ignored for this test, as they are likely to be very
inaccurate, and in general are not journeys we are interested in. The results
are for all journeys over 100m in length is shown in Table 1 and for journeys
over 10km in length in Table 2.
Calculated Miss Calculated Hit
True Miss 98,000 2,000
True Hit 3,000 2,000
Table 1: Vector pairs for journeys over 100m in length
Calculated Miss Calculated Hit
True Miss 2448 160
True Hit 200 1036
Table 2: Vector pairs for journeys over 10km in length
(3.12) From Table 1 we can see that the number of times we correctly predicted
that two journeys were the same is of equal size to the number of times we
predicted they were the same when the journeys were not. There were a
lot of false hits here which suggest it couldn’t accurately identify journeys
which were the same. It also missed an even larger number that were the
same which is didn’t identify.
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(3.13) The results were much better when only longer journeys were considered
(over 10km) as seen in Table 2. Here 86 percent of the journeys we identified
as the same were indeed the same journey which is far higher than before.
However it still missed about 16 percent of journeys which were the same.
However this is far better than before and suggests the journey vector can
identify similar journeys when the journeys are long enough.
4 Junctions
(4.1) The greatest errors coming from journey vector amalgamations will be from
junctions where the distance travelled after a junction will be assumed to be
in the direction of the previous bearing before the junction (see figure).
(4.2) With the variables chosen some quick calculations suggest we can ignore the
effects of decelerating before a junction and accelerating away so consider a
car moving at constant speed before, at and after a single junction which
makes an angle of θ with the incoming road (on which the latest bearing has
been taken). A car travelling at an average 15 m/s (approximately 30 mph)
will therefore travel 900m within a 60 second window between readings. In
the general case we assume the car travels a distance D between readings, a
distance d between the preceding data point and reaching the junction, and
so a distance D − d afterwards on the new bearing. If we let x denote the
actual journey vector, then the true bearing between data points is denoted
φ and the distance between the actual position and calculated position is
errorabs where:
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(4.3)
errorabs = s(D − d) sin (θ/2)
x2 = D2 − 2d[(1− cos θ)(D − d)]
cosφ =
d+ (D − d) cos θ
[D2 − 2d(1− cos θ)(D − d)]1/2
(4.4) Clearly, largest errors occur when d is small compared to D (furthest distance
travelled on ”wrong” bearing) and as θ increases (which could easily include
angles greater than 90 degrees at junctions that ”double back”. No further
investigation was carried out during the meeting, but it may be useful to
use these expressions to study how such errors accumulate over several time
steps and multiple ”realistic” junctions.
5 Conclusion
(5.1) Practical experimentation and a literature search makes us confident that
given bearing and distance readings in the order that they are taken can
be thought of as being sufficient to be able to reconstruct sufficiently long
journeys using curve matching algorithms and suitably processed maps in
acceptable time limits, and so if bearing and distance information is to be
retained then it cannot be done so in this manner.
(5.2) If the GPS data is removed and the time stamps for each journey removed
and the data entries randomised, then the ”estimated journey vector” is still
retained. This ”estimated journey vector” can be an accurate estimate of
the real journey vector but only if either data is taken very frequency (like
in the every second data) or the journeys are long enough. The journey
vector could be used to identify if two journeys are the same but due to the
number of false positives, would only be accurate for longer journeys (greater
than say 20km). As such it is limited in the cases where it could be used to
reconstruct or identify journeys.
(5.3) Greatest errors in estimated journey vectors will most likely be introduced
at junctions, in particular junctions making a large angle with the preceding
road and readings that occur most recently to the arrival at a junction.
Estimates on error have been derived which may be studied for the effect of
cumulative errors arising from multiple junctions over a journey.
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